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Abstract
We propose a generative model for adversarial attack. The
model generates subtle but predictive patterns from the input.
To perform an attack, it replaces the patterns of the input with
those generated based on examples from some other class.
We demonstrate our model by attacking CNN on MNIST.
Introduction
Recent researches show that machine learning models are
vulnerable to adversarial attacks Szegedy et al. (2014);
Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy (2015). Slightly modifi-
cations on input data can fool a state-of-the-art classifier.
The adversarial brittleness restricts applications of machine
learning models in high security fields, and thus both adver-
sarial attacks and defenses have attracted significant atten-
tion these years.
Based on the amount of knowledge the adversary has
about the target model, adversarial attacks can be catego-
rized into white box attacks and black box attacks (Kurakin
et al., 2018). In white box scenarios, the adversary has all the
knowledge about the target model, including the model ar-
chitecture and all the parameter values, while in the black
box scenarios, the adversary can only “query” the target
model with input data to obtain the output, or even is not
allowed to do this.
Most white box attacks generate adversarial examples by
directly performing optimization in input space under some
norm constraints encouraging visual realism. Instead, we
consider to generate the perturbations through a generative
model. It is observed that unrecognizable images which do
not resemble images from the training set but which typi-
cally look like noise while still being classified by the model
with high confidence Schott et al. (2019). Inspired by this
observation, we propose to use a generative model to gener-
ate a subtle but predictive patterns from the raw input, and
construct adversarial examples by replacing the input’s pre-
dictive patterns with those from another class.
Methodology
Problem Definition Given a target classifier y = f(x),
which make decision based on the conditional density of y
given x, i.e.,
f(x) = argmax
y
p˜(y|x). (1)
One example of such a conditional density is a deep neural
network with softmax as the output function of the last layer.
We want to fool the classifier f(x) by slightly perturbing the
input. Instead of learning the perturbations by performing
optimization in the input space, we propose to extract the
subtle but predictive patterns from the input x and replace
them with the patterns extracted from some example of an-
other class. In particular, We model the predictive patterns
with a generative model.
Model Given a labeled example (x, y) ∈ Rd×R, we asso-
ciate it with a random variable η ∈ Rd. We desire η contains
all the predictive information of x with respect to y. There-
fore we assume that y is independent of x given η, i.e.,
p(y, η|x) = p˜(y|η)p(η|x) (2)
where the density of y conditioned on η is exactly the condi-
tional density the target classifier f(x) built upon. Also, we
assume the input lies on a low dimensional manifold, and
thus there exists a low dimensional latent variable z ∈ Rm
conditioned on which x and η are independent, i.e.,
p(η, z|x) = p(η|z)p(z|x), (3)
where p(η|z) = p(η|NN(z, y)) and p(z|x) =
p(z|NN(x, y)) are Gaussian density parameterized by
neural networks. In order to extract class dependent pat-
terns, we make the neural networks also take y as input.
Then the conditional density of y given x is
p(y|x) =
∫
p(y|η)p(η|z)p(z|x)dηdz. (4)
Learning To learn the parameters, We minimize the fol-
lowing objective function,
L =
N∑
n=1
Ep(zn|xn,yn)
{
Ep(ηn|zn) [log p˜(yn|ηn)]
}
+KL [p(zn|xn, yn)‖N(zn|0, I)]
+ Ep(ηn|zn)[r(‖ηn‖, )].
(5)
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Algorithm 1 Adversarial Attacks
Input: a test example (x∗, y∗), a target class yt, the tar-
get classifier f , the encoder p(z|NN(x, y)), the decoder
p(η|NN(z, y)), the norm bound , and the maximum
number of iterations K
Output: an adversarial example xadv
xadv0 := x
∗, n := 0
repeat
zn ∼ p(z|NN(xadvn−1, y∗)); ηn ∼ p(η|NN(zn, y∗))
xsubn := Clipx∗,(x
adv
n−1 − ηn)
Sampled xt from the target class yt
zaddn ∼ p(z|NN(xt, yt)); ηaddn ∼ p(η|NN(zaddn , yt))
xadvn := Clipx∗,(x
sub
n + η
add
n )
n := n+ 1
until f misclassifies xadv or n = K
All the expectations are taken with respect to reparam-
eterizable densities and are estimated using Monte Carlo
integration. Note that we do not modify any parameters of
the target model p˜(y|η). The last term is an additional reg-
ularization term, which enforces the norm of η does not ex-
ceed certain threshold  in expectation, where r(‖η‖, ) =
relu(‖η‖ − ). We use the L∞ norm throughout the paper.
The objective (5) consists of three terms. The first term
is a lower bound of the log-marginal likelihood and encour-
ages η to contain all the predictive information. The sec-
ond KL divergence term regularizes the encoder p(z|x) to-
wards a standard Gaussian density. The last term is also an
additional regularization term, which enforces the norm of
η does not exceed certain threshold  in expectation, where
r(‖η‖, ) = relu(‖η‖−). We use the L∞ norm throughout
the paper.
Attack To perform attack, we replace the predictive pat-
terns η∗ of a given test example (x∗, y∗) with the patterns ηt
of some example (xt, yt) from a target class yt. In the case
of non-targeted attack, we choose to use the class as which
the target classifier most probably misclassifies x∗, i.e.,
yt = argmax p˜(y|x∗), s.t. yt 6= y∗. (6)
To do this, we pass the test example (x∗, y∗) and the target
example (xt,t ) to our model to obtain the patterns η∗ and ηt,
respectively. Then we replace the patterns in the test input x∗
by setting
xˆ∗ = x∗ − η∗ + ηt. (7)
After every modification, we clip the modified input to en-
force the L∞ norm of its difference with the raw input x∗
is below the threshold . The whole attack procedure is re-
peated until the target classifier make a mistake or a given
maximum number of iterations is reached. We give a sum-
marize of the attack in Algorithm 1.
Experiments
Configurations
Hyperparameters and implementation details The ar-
chitecture of the proposed model: The encoder has 2 layers
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Figure 1: A visualization of the attack procedure. The three
rows show the raw image, the image with generated patterns
subtracted, and the adversarial image (the image with pat-
terns replaced). The true labels and the predictions given by
the target classifier is shown at the top and the bottom, re-
spectively.
with kernel sizes= [5, 5], strides= [1, 2, 2, 1] and feature map
sizes= [784,256]. The Decoder architecture has also 2 layers
with kernel sizes= [5, 5], strides= [1, 2, 2, 1] and feature
map sizes= [256,784]. The first layers have RELU activa-
tion functions, the last layer is a full connection layer, and
all layers except the last one use Batch Normalization. We
trained the proposed model with the Adam optimizer. We
tuned the dimension L of the latent space (ending up with L
= 30); started with a high weight for the KL-divergence term
at the beginning of training (which was gradually decreased
from a factor of 10 to 1 over 50 epochs);
Hyperparameters for the attack model We set the ad-
versarial perturbation size L∞ = 0.3 as a threshold. We set
the number of the iteration t = 30 as a threshold.
Hyperparameters for the target model The architecture
of the CNNs has kernel sizes = [5, 4, 3, 5], strides = [1, 2, 2,
1], and feature map sizes = [20, 70, 256, 10]. All layers use
ELU activation functions and all layers except the last one
apply Batch Normalization. The CNNs are both trained on
the cross entropy loss with the Adam optimizer. The param-
eters maximizing the test cross entropy.
Evaluation
We evaluate our model on MNIST. We apply our model to
generate adversarial examples to a convolutional neural net-
work (CNN). We generate adversarial examples under an
L∞ bound of 0.3. Table 1 shows the successful attack rate
and the original accuracy of CNN.
To demonstrate that our model is capable of learning pre-
dictive patterns, we let the target model make prediction bas-
Model CNN
Accuracy 99.35%
Attack Success Rate 94.14%
Table 1: Model Accuracy and Attack Success Rate
Class 0 1 2 3 4
Avg. Norm 0.291 0.178 0.284 0.289 0.294
Class 5 6 7 8 9
Avg. Norm 0.275 0.289 0.268 0.293 0.289
Table 2: Average Norm of Generated Patterns
ing on the generated patterns solely, and it achieve 100% ac-
curacy on the test set. We report the average L∞ norm of the
generated patterns from each class in Table 2. It can be seen
that the norm of generated patterns are below the threshold
on average.
In Figure 1, we give a visualization of the images under
the attack procedure. We also plot changes in scores the tar-
get classifier assigning to different classes during attack in
Figure 2. We can see that the score of the true label given
by the target classifier decreases after the generated patterns
are subtracted from the raw input, and the score of the target
class increases significantly after the patterns of the input are
replaced.
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Figure 2: Changes in scores the target classifier assigning to
different class during attack.
